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Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257 (2005).
I. CONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL HISTORY
When E. M. Forster chose "Only connect.. ." as an epigraph to his novel
Howards End,' he surely wasn't thinking-it is safe to say-of the kind of
connectedness among polities that Professor Wayne Logan describes in his rich,
measured, and illuminating article. This should come as no surprise. Forster was
exalting the weightless energy of passionate encounter. Logan's research, by
contrast, reveals the potential gloominess of connectedness.
By focusing on the legal implications of the migratory patterns of criminal
offenders, Logan's article asks two important questions that have been given spare
and insufficient attention. The first focuses on how states construct the criminal
histories of the offenders who are now in their midst. The second asks what
tradeoffs are implicated as states make their choices regarding how to interpret the
pasts of these itinerant offenders as they relate to registration requirements or
sentence enhancements for recidivism.
Answering the first question, Logan observes the existence of two archetypal
approaches a state might adopt when assessing an offender's prior record: an
internal one and an external one.3 Under the internal approach, the use of "out-of-
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E. M. FORSTER, Epigraph to HowARDs END (Vintage Int'l 1989) (1910).
2 See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice
Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 257, 260 (2005) (examining problems arising from the
diversity among states in the area of criminal laws regarding sex offenders).
3 Here I follow Logan's practice of collapsing the distinction between the "strict internal"
and the "modified internal" approaches. Id. at 267-68. The basis for this elision is practical:
theoretically, states might decide to take a "strict internal" approach, by which they refuse to consider
altogether a person's conduct or convictions that occurred out of state. See id (noting that, by the
mid 1970s, only Virginia had taken this approach). The distinction between the modified internal
approach and the strict internal approach is purely academic now, since, according to Logan's
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state convictions, and any punishment resulting from those convictions, [must]
satisfy the eligibility requirements of the forum state's registration or recidivist
enhancement law.",4 On this view, for example, a state would not apply a recidivist
sentencing enhancement to an offender on the basis of a conviction in another state
for conduct that would not be illegal in the forum state. 5 By contrast, under the
external approach, a forum state faithfully implements the consequences of the
legal judgments of its fellow sovereign states, rather than re-examining those
determinations to see if the underlying circumstances (or length of sentence) would
have initiated the same legal consequences in the forum state.6 Consequently, with
the external approach, an offender's former actions potentially trigger a "marked
trail" effect in the new forum state. Of course, jurisdictions need not be consistent
between recidivism and registration requirements: some states might adopt, for
instance, an internal approach with respect to recidivist sentencing enhancements
but an external approach to sex offender registration laws.7
With respect to the second question regarding tradeoffs between the
approaches, Logan capably shows how both approaches raise difficult policy
questions.8 Indeed, simply by ventilating the various issues as he does, Logan
helpfully foregrounds many otherwise easily obscured value trade-offs, and thus
makes a profound contribution to the study of federalism and American criminal
law. 9
This essay registers no real quarrel with Logan's analysis of the scope and
nature of criminal justice connectedness. My focus, instead, is on the normative
argument in Logan's apparent preference for the internal approach. 10 I choose this
research, no jurisdiction employs the "inviting" strategy of a strict internal approach. See id. at 260
(noting that the strict internal approach incentivizes prior offenders to emigrate); id. at 269 n.54, 276-
77 n.92 (classifying every state's approach as either "modified internal" or "external"). Hence the
"internal" approach described in the text's next sentence is actually a "modified internal approach,"
but for shorthand's sake, I refer to it simply as the "internal" approach hereinafter, unless otherwise
specified.
4 Id. at 261.
5 The "forum state," on Logan's account, is the state currently assessing whether to impose a
sentence enhancement or registration requirement; the forum state can be contrasted with the "foreign
state," which is the prior state of residence and/or conviction. See id. at 266 n. 4 l (defining "foreign"
jurisdictions as domestic jurisdictions other than the forum jurisdiction).
6 Id. at 261.
7 Id. at 290 n. 167 (discussing New York's use of the internal approach in some contexts and
the external approach in others).
8 See id. at 292-329.
9 In addition to analyzing the curlicues of horizontal federalism, Logan has recently explored
how the federal government, by adopting a largely "external" approach, "infuses federal law with the
normative judgments of the respective states." Wayne A. Logan, Creating a "Hydra in
Government": Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 67 (2006).
10 I say "apparent" because Logan plays his (normative) cards close to his vest in this piece, at
least until the end, where his antipathy for the external approach appears more pronounced. See
Logan, supra note 2, at 320-29.
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focus not because I am convinced that the external approach is the obviously
superior one. Rather, I think Logan overestimates its deficiencies. The goal of this
essay, then, is to adumbrate a few of the rejoinders available in defense of the
external approach against Logan's criticisms. To the extent these responsive
arguments are persuasive, then state courts and/or legislatures will be in a better
position to select an approach more consonant with their particular concerns and
objectives."
II. THE EXTERNAL APPROACH'S HIDDEN VIRTUES
As alluded to above, Logan ultimately sides with the internal approach. This
might seem odd as Logan himself recognizes several distinct advantages to the
external approach. First, at least as compared to the internal approach, the external
approach advances judicial economy, sparing courts the task and expense of
comparing whether the predicate conduct would satisfy the forum state's eligibility
requirements for offender registration laws or sentence enhancements.12 Second,
by serving judicial economy, the external approach is capable of serving
distributive justice goals as well, since a dollar saved in administrative costs is a
dollar available for helping other social projects. 13 Third, by giving effect to the
prior judicial decisions and legislative determinations of foreign states, the external
approach instantiates comity among the several states, evidencing respect for the
equal dignity of the states.' 4  Fourth, the external approach is often the better
11 Of course, it is possible that a coordination rule will emerge under which all states pick
either the internal or the external approach. I leave for another day whether such a hypothetical rule
would, absent constitutional amendment, survive litigation challenges. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561 & n.3 (1995) (noting traditional role of states in regulating criminal justice
matters).
12 Bear in mind that what I am calling the internal approach is really the "modified" internal
approach. See supra note 3. The distinction is critical here because it would be just as economical,
indeed perhaps more so, to adopt the strict internal approach, since no inquiry into extraterritorial
wrongdoing would be necessary at all.
13 On this point, Logan, supra note 2, at 294 n.183, refers us to Mitchell v. Great Works
Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 9662), a case where Justice Story
denied the filing of federal suits in state court because such practices "may most materially interfere
with the convenience of their own courts, and the rights of their own citizens, and be attended with
great expense to the state, as well as great delays in the administration of justice." Of course, the
distributive justice gains in judicial economy are likely offset by the expenses associated with
incarcerating offenders for longer periods of time for sentence enhancements; but the costs of these
longer sentences may, in turn, generate some benefits such as crime reduction through incapacitation
or general or specific deterrence.
14 Michael O'Hear has suggested to me that the value of comity is oversold here so long as
these registration requirements or recidivism enhancements are justified as preventive measures.
That is because, to the extent these provisions are imposed for future social self-protection, only the
legislated values of the (forum) state in which the offender is currently living (or more likely to be
committing an offense) should have significance, and not the values embraced, potentially years ago,
by another state. This point is surely correct, but only so far as it goes. My sense is that these
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vehicle for providing notice to a migrating offender. Under the external approach,
for example, the offender need only know one set of laws regarding registration
requirements-those of the state in which she committed the offense. If states
employ an internal approach, then migrant offenders will have greater difficulty in
keeping abreast of whether or not they are expected to register. Finally, the
external approach is more likely to reinforce norms of individual responsibility and
accountability, since it signals, as President Clinton said, that if you break the law,
"the law will follow you wherever you go-state to state, town to town."' 5 In
other words, if an offender must register in Alabama as a consequence of some
crime she committed there, she would not be able to escape those registration
requirements simply by moving to a different state, where the same underlying
conduct would have been perfectly legal.
Despite the variegated benefits of the external approach, Logan condemns the
external approach for four reasons: its harshness, its creation of inequalities, its
denigration of state autonomy, and, relatedly, its discouragement of jurisdictional
competition for citizen migration. In what follows, I explain why these charges are
overstated or misplaced.
A. Is the External Approach Unduly Harsh?
To begin with, Logan notes that an embrace of the external approach can lead
to the imposition of evermore onerous registration requirements or sentence
enhancements based on weird predicate crimes or harsh procedural sorting rules
that are extant in the several states. 16 It may be true that, on the margins, the
external approach leads to more harm to defendants, 7 but Logan's article does not
furnish us with enough evidence to believe that is conclusively the case, as there
are a variety of circumstances in which the internal approach may lead to worse
outcomes for migrant offenders. For example, forum states may have a lower bar
enhancements or registration requirements are often added precisely to further punish (on the basis of
desert) the affected classes of offenders. When that's the case, comity could make sense again.
15 Logan, supra note 2, at 261.
16 See, e.g., People v. Mazzie, 358 N.Y.S.2d 307, 311-12 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (noting that under
an external approach, New York would have to extend felony enhancements for those "convicted of
Fornication in Alabama... Seduction in Texas ... Blasphemy in New Jersey ... Vagrancy in Rhode
Island, or of stealing a library book in North Carolina . . . or a turkey in Arkansas" (citations
omitted)); Mitchell v. State, 467 A.2d 522, 533 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (noting that the legislature
did not intend to impose a mandatory sentence because of a prior conviction for "[c]utting cacti in
California, uprooting the state flower (rhododendron) in West Virginia, or desecrating a confederate
cemetery in Mississippi"). Logan appears to share these concerns. See Logan, supra note 2, at 303
("[T]he notable idiosyncrasies of state laws are permitted to affect outcomes in other states. For
instance, if an individual moves from South Carolina to one of the fifteen other states using an
external test for registration, the Palmetto State's unusually broad gamut of registerable offenses will
come into play.").
17 The empirical determination would ultimately depend not only on the number of states
adopting the internal approach, but also on the number of cases heard by each state.
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for longer registration requirements than foreign states; thus, out-of-state conduct
that may be deemed relatively benign in the foreign state may prompt severe
consequences once the migrant offender moves to the forum state. 18 Indeed, as
Logan himself notes, the external approach would lead to better circumstances for
offenders on occasions where "a crime classified as a misdemeanor in a foreign
state can be treated by the forum as a felony for purposes of assessing recidivism,"
or where the forum state considers deferred adjudications or prior juvenile
dispositions but the foreign state does not.19
That said, even if it could be shown that the external approach is a net
detriment to defendants because it tends to widen the scope of penality, this is not
always bad for society. For one thing, take note that the democratic weirdness of
federalism's fifty labs approach may cut in many directions. One need only
imagine that the forum state adopts the internal approach and also fails to
recognize the crime of marital rape, or refuses to impose higher penalties for
racially-motivated assaults or driving under the influence. Shorter criminal codes
(and sentences) are not inexorably better criminal codes (and sentences).
Consequently, when offenders move to an internal approach jurisdiction, there is a
decent chance that the resulting outcomes will offend, rather than reflect,
progressive political sensibilities in the forum state because the criminal codes of
foreign states may actually serve retributive (or other) ends more effectively than
those of the forum state.
In this regard, by giving effect to the "marked trail" of an offender's conduct
through the external approach, a forum state may in fact be able to better conduct
comparative experiments in crime policy than they otherwise would be able to
perform.2° Of course, this would raise, albeit in a different way, Logan's
pronounced concern that the external approach entails a basic unfairness by
treating similarly situated offenders differently. 2' This concern warrants careful
scrutiny.
18 Logan, supra note 2, at 301; see also id. at 305 n.256 (discussing Hendrix v. Taylor, 579
S.E.2d 320, 325 (S.C. 2003), in which the forum state required an immigrant, under the internal
approach, to register for life, even though the foreign state's registration requirements would have
ended after five years).
19 Logan, supra note 2, at 301 (citations omitted).
20 For example, states could track recidivism rates of offenders with similar offenses but
different penalties that result from application of the external approach. See Doron Teichman,
Decentralizing Crime Control: The Political Economy Perspective, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1749, 1758 n.
53 (2006) ("Actually, the external approach offers many opportunities for those engaged in empirical
studies. Rather than comparing two sets of criminals in different states with different legal regimes,
the external approach will create within the state two sets of criminals that are subject to different
legal regimes. Measuring the differences between these two groups will isolate the effect of the legal
policy from differences attributable to social differences between states.").
21 Logan, supra note 2, at 303.
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B. Does the External Approach Promote Inequality?
Logan's basic point about unequal treatment resulting from the external
approach is that "[w]hen forum states defer to outcomes reached in foreign states
with significant variations in substantive laws, punishments, and procedural rights,
otherwise similarly situated individuals can be treated unequally. 2 2 To see how
this works, consider two types of inequality under the external approach that
Logan espies:
The first [unequal treatment] involves immigrants from states with
narrower registration eligibility criteria; they, unlike the immigrant from,
say, South Carolina, will not be subject to registration because it was not
required by the foreign state from which they migrated. The second
arises when an offender in the forum state is not required to register as a
result of being convicted of an offense (e.g., peeping), yet the newcomer
is so required, again because of the idiosyncratic nature of the foreign
state's registration law. Alternatively, the duration of registration can be
made lengthier for newcomers if the forum state ties the newcomer's
period of registration to the duration imposed by the state left behind. In
each such situation, registration, with its direct and collateral burdens
(including possibly community notification, with its litany of negative
consequences), is driven by the geographic happenstance of where the
foreign conviction occurred, leading to unequal outcomes in the forum
state.23
To be sure, unequal treatment of similarly situated offenders should give us
pause-as a normative and constitutional matter.2" But the unequal treatment
resulting from adoption of the external approach is not necessarily "unwarranted"
or "unfair" if it doesn't involve offenders who are actually similarly situated.
Logan's first scenario compares immigrants from different states who arrive in the
same new forum state; one is susceptible to more onerous registration requirements
while another is not, merely because of where the foreign conviction occurred.
According to Logan, this disparity is troublesome, as is the resulting disparity
between the immigrant offender and the native offender in the second scenario.
To my mind, both scenarios of unequal treatment do not present any real
unfairness. Upon scrutiny, the apparently unfair aspect of this unequal treatment
22 Id.
23 Id. at 304-05.
24 See Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge
of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with the author) (arguing
that disparate treatment of similarly situated offenders creates "gashes in the moral fabric of impartial
justice"); Dan Markel, Luck or Law? The Constitutional Case Against Indeterminate Sentencing
Schemes, 8-9 (Aug. 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (arguing that certain
discretionary sentencing schemes are unconstitutional).
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dissolves simply by recourse to the very point about notice that Logan
acknowledges elsewhere. Let me elaborate. In the case of the two immigrant
offenders now in the forum state, it makes little sense to think that they are
similarly situated if they committed their offenses in different states against
different sovereigns. The same holds for the comparison of the perpetrator of an
offense in jurisdiction X to the perpetrator of the same offense in jurisdiction Y.
These offenders are not similarly situated precisely because the predicate conduct
was perpetrated against different sovereigns whose democratic institutions may
legitimately issue different rules with different consequences. 25  This matters
because, in a federal scheme of decentralized democracy, an offense of drug
possession in state X may reasonably be regarded as having a different valence
than those schemes criminalizing drug possession in state y. 26 (Of course, we
might not like all the laws resulting from the plural nature of the states, but this
calls, perhaps, for increased constitutional regulation of criminal law legislation,
not an abandonment of federalism as such.) Moreover, given the variety of ways
in which similar acts committed in different states may reveal different attitudes
about criminal propensities, there is further reason for thinking that the offenders
in Logan's two scenarios are not similarly situated-though of course, this would
depend on the assumption that the offenders had knowledge of these varying
penalties.
In short, to generate a legitimate inference of unwarranted disparity, one
should focus attention on differences between two similarly situated perpetrators of
the same offense in the same jurisdiction. Neither of Logan's two scenarios
present that prerequisite.27  Indeed, when a forum state effectuates the
consequences that would be visited upon an offender had she remained in the
foreign state-by adoption of the external approach-the forum state is actually
serving the cause of equality because it ensures that similarly situated defendants
25 One might still venture that Logan's hypothetical scenarios present the appearance of
inequality, which could undermine popular support for the criminal law. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson
& John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 476 (1997) (explaining that social
groups more likely flout a particular prohibition if the overall legal system has a bad reputation). But
in the context of the choice between the external and internal approach, I doubt the "appearances of
inequality" here will mobilize massive resentment of the system at large.
26 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-25 (2003) (emphasizing the tradition of judicial
deference to legislative crime-control strategies).
27 And it might be the case that Logan's preferred solution leads to greater harshness, which
was one of Logan's primary concerns. As Professor Doron Teichman writes, "Logan's conclusion
that unequal treatment necessarily implies unfairness is tenuous since he employs a strictly ex post
view of fairness. He implicitly assumes that if Michigan did not adopt the external approach
everyone would be treated equally, and the immigrant from South Carolina would not have to register
as a sex offender in Michigan. However, once we shift to the ex ante point of view, this result does
not necessarily hold. Facing sex offender migration from South Carolina due to the harsh legal
conditions there, Michigan might be compelled to duplicate those conditions in order to cut down
unwanted migration. Thus, both the immigrant from South Carolina and the native resident of
Michigan will have to register. True, Logan's world is fair in the sense that everyone is treated
equally; but everyone is treated more harshly in his world as well." Teichman, supra note 20, at 1758.
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convicted in the same jurisdiction endure the same kind of consequences,
regardless if one of the offenders decides to go to another jurisdiction. More
importantly, no unfairness or surprise to the offender can be claimed because she is
(presumptively) on notice from the outset; she is simply receiving under the
external approach what she would otherwise have received had she stayed in the
foreign state.28 In other words, while there may be differential treatment of the
offenders in the scenarios presented by Professor Logan, such differences are not
themselves instances of an injustice.
C. Does the External Approach Undermine State Autonomy?
In addition to his concerns about widening penality and inequality, Logan also
fears the external approach leads to the erosion of autonomy in individual states.
This erosion of self-government occurs on account of the ossification effects
resulting when states, through the external approach, "replicate temporally and
geographically contingent aspects of substantive criminal law, punishment, and
procedure.,29 Logan thinks these "frozen-in-amber" effects are more pronounced
in jurisdictions employing the external approach because, under the internal
approach, such "intergenerational drift" might be checked by the forum state's own
substantive rules and procedural requirements. 30 There are two reasons to hesitate
before condemning these replication and ossification effects. First, as shown
earlier, because the internal approach is not always less harsh and because criminal
codes in the foreign state may be more "progressive,' the replication and
ossification created by the external approach might not be bad for defendants or
society.
Second, and more relevant to the autonomy erosion claim, there are two
reasons states may see their choice of the external approach as an expression of
their autonomy, rather than as a denigration of it. First, a state may view its choice
of the external approach as saying to an offender something like: "if you made the
choice to violate the criminal law of another state, we have a concern you might do
so here as well, even though what you did there would not have been a violation
here." Thus, a state might self-consciously try to enhance its crime reduction
strategy against specific threats by adopting the external approach.32 Second,
notwithstanding its "right to act autonomously and independently, free of the
28 For these reasons, states adopting the external approach would have little difficulty in
justifying these "disparate treatments" under the Equal Protection Clause's rational basis test. And
the constitutional challenges brought so far have failed for these or other reasons. See Logan, supra
note 2, at 311, 311 n.287 (discussing failure of challenges to West Virginia and New York laws).
29 Id. at 307.
30 Id. at 308.
31 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
32 Thanks to J.B. Ruhl for this point.
580 [Vol 4:573
CONNECTEDNESS AND ITS DISCONTENTS
constraining authority of other governmental units," 33 a state might adopt the
external approach because it wants to see its norms adhered to when its offenders
migrate to other states. If-the state sees itself in an iterative process by which it
believes that other states will reciprocate with adoption of the external approach,
then its choice to embrace the external approach will make sense. To illustrate:
State X might be willing to give effect to State Y's laws to offenders whose crimes
were prosecuted in State Y if State X thinks that State Y (or States A through W)
will adopt and abide by the external approach. That's because State X believes
that in subsequent cases, those states will give effect to State X's laws to former X-
convicted offenders who migrate to these other states.
Indeed, State X might try to persuade other states to adopt an external
approach so that they give effect to State X's legislative views on offenders
previously convicted in State X. Though they have no power to mandate the
extraterritorial application of their laws, the states employing the external approach
might try to convince the "internal approach" states that they are acting as "free-
riders." They are free-riders because internal approach states have their laws apply
in their own jurisdiction to indigenous and immigrant offenders and they also have
their laws apply to their own former citizens who migrate to external approach
states. Without a rule mandating one approach or another, internal approach states
are able to enjoy a kind of law-hoarding, thereby undermining norms of
reciprocity.
There is a solution available to bring this "game" to equilibrium: states that
care about this problem could use a bifurcated strategy. The courts in the forum
state could apply the external approach to offenders from other external approach
states while using the internal approach against offenders migrating from internal
approach states. But the fact that such a strategy is not used indicates that this
unfairness is either deemed relatively insignificant or that the unfairness has not
been made obvious to relevant policymakers.
D. Does the External Approach Discourage Democratic Experimentalism and
Jurisdictional Competition?
Logan concludes his critique of the external approach by contending that
states that adopt the internal approach are better able to serve as "stalwarts of
'fifty-labs' federalism. ' 34  I find this claim puzzling. To begin with, a state
adopting the external approach is at least equally able to convey its respect for
fifty-labs federalism precisely because it may doggedly apply its own laws to
offenders who commit crimes in that state while at the same time demonstrating
equal respect for the dignity of its sister states by implementing the laws of its
sister states on their migrant offenders. Contra Logan, the external approach poses
no real jeopardy to the spirit of democratic experimentalism-after all, the
33 Logan, supra note 2, at 324.
" Id. at 318.
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proportion of migrant offenders is likely to be small compared to the number of
indigenous offenders,35 so lawmakers will not likely be deterred from trying to
undertake criminal law innovations to see how they work. Indeed, the external
approach allows forum states to adopt more lenient legislation toward its own
citizens without having to worry that it will serve as a magnet for opportunistic
offenders migrating from elsewhere.36
Indeed, for the same reason, the risk attending Logan's fear that the external
approach prompts a slippage in democratic accountability 37 seems remote. How
many instances are there where someone convicted of a weird crime in another
state-Logan's examples are adultery and peeping 38-has that offense later serve
as a predicate to enhanced sentences or registration requirements in a forum state
adopting the external approach? My guess is not that many.39 Unfortunately,
Logan's article (quite reasonably) does not provide the empirics. But even if it
were a non-trivial number, calling that result, as Logan does, "stealth legislation"40
is inapposite. After all, no citizens of the forum state will face penalty
enhancements for such conduct if that conduct is committed in the forum state.
As long as the forum state's citizens are free to engage in that predicate
conduct, then virtually no risk to Alexander Hamilton's vision of the states
competing for the "people's 'affection"' materializes-because people are still
able to make informed choices about where to live ex ante-that is, before any
crime is committed.4 1 If I want to move away from a state that makes peeping a
felony, I can do so at no penalty if I have not committed an offense. And as
Professor Teichman notes, even after the offender commits a crime, there is no
"penalty" on migration by use of the external approach. Instead, the external
approach "simply sustains the same legal regime that [the offender] was subject to
in his initial place of residence. Hence, if an offender wishes to migrate from
South Carolina to Michigan because of a lucrative job offer, the fact that his
35 Cf Teichman, supra note 20, at 1759 ("[Tjhe external approach by definition applies only
to individuals immigrating to the state, which is a rather small subset of individuals. Between 1995
and 2000 the interstate migration rate was 86.7 per 1,000 residents. Thus, this does not seem to be a
practical way to harshen a state's entire criminal code, and one should not exaggerate the concerns
arising from it.").
36 See Teichman, supra note 20, at 1758 ("Not using the external approach, on the other hand,
will bring about uniformity in the area since states will simply converge to the harshest possible
standards.").
37 See Logan, supra note 2, at 322-23.
38 Id. at 322.
39 See supra note 35.
40 Logan, supra note 2, at 323.
41 See id. at 325 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime
Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1835 (2005) (discussing the
incentives for local communities to harshen their criminal justice systems in order to encourage
offenders to migrate to other jurisdictions).
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registration requirement will follow him only means that he will be indifferent in
his residence decision from that perspective. If there is social capital to be gained
from migration, the individual will still migrate. 42
By maintaining the position that the external approach serves as an
undesirable "penalty" on inter-state migration, Logan appears to think that people
should be able to commit an offense and then escape (some of) the consequences
of that conduct by moving to an "easier" place to live. Certainly, offenders who
serve their sentence and complete all their conditions of release should enjoy the
fruits of mobility associated with the American religion of self-reinvention.43 But
by what moral rights do they merit a free roaming pass prior to their release from
the criminal justice system?44 It is unlikely this is the kind of jurisdictional
competition Hamilton or other federalists had in mind. Moreover, to the extent
that internal approach states end up being harsher on defendants, 45 then that too
will deter migration on the margins, thereby depriving "prospective state[s]" of
"such persons' talents and resources. 46  At the level of abstraction Logan has
pitched this inquiry, the selection of the internal approach over the external
approach can often cut both ways.
Finally, to the extent anyone in an external approach state is troubled by the
introduction of what Logan calls "stealth legislation, 47 she might take comfort in
knowing that her own state's weird legislation is being given effect in other
42 See Teichman, supra note 20, at 1759.
43 Cf City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) ("We have expressly identified this
right to remove from one place to another according to inclination as an attribute of personal liberty
protected by the Constitution.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
44 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003) (noting that ex-offenders under supervision are
not "free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens"). Of course, this point is
compatible with a belief that the criminal justice systems across the states have gone too far in
intruding upon ex-offenders' lives. The proper response to that problem, however, is broad-based
democratic reforms of the criminal justice system in the foreign state, not application of the internal
approach to those few migrant offenders affected in the forum state.
45 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
46 Logan, supra note 2, at 326. One might wonder whether use of the external approach
implicates values such as an offender's fundamental right to travel. Although this topic is well
beyond the scope of this essay, it bears mention that the external approach hardly interferes with that
right as such. It simply ensures that the migrant offender receives no particular benefit from leaving
the foreign jurisdiction.
47 Id. at 323. Logan seems worried that use of the external approach will mean that a state
can "effectively codify 'peeping' (South Carolina) or adultery (Kansas) as convictions requiring
registration" if it is fearful of legislating such requirements through "the formal legislative process."
Id. at 322. It seems just as plausible that, to the extent that legislators are paying attention to these
applications of the external approach in their jurisdiction, they would be spurred to repeal antiquated
legislation that might still exist on their books. More likely still is that all such signals from the
occasional case of the migrant offender from the "weird" state are far from the attention of state
legislators in external approach states. Finally, Logan's awareness of the costs of such "stealth
legislation," id. at 322 n.343, would countervail against these concerns about democratic
accountability.
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external approach states. Logan correctly worries that the external approach might
give extended effect to laws like the ones invalidated in Lawrence v. Texas.48 But
that is just one side of the coin. The flip side is that progressive states might be
criminalizing marital rape, or making it easier to prosecute date rape, and, through
the external approach, they are seeing norms shift in "better directions." In the
end, there is an unspoken quidpro quo among the external approach states--one
that Logan appears reluctant to acknowledge. To the extent there are many
Lawrence-type laws out there, litigants can always appeal to have criminal
legislation regulated by the federal Constitution. 49 And for those states that are
still worried about the injustices potentially worked by replicating weird laws of
other states, they have yet another strategy available to them: employ the external
approach generally while simultaneously carving out specific safe harbors for
particular conduct the legislature deems worthy of protection. On this view, a
legislature could cleanly direct its courts to exclude from consideration those out-
of-state convictions arising from, say, consensual sodomy or growing marijuana
for medicinal use.
III. FEARING DEMOCRACY?
In reviewing Logan's multiple concerns about the external approach, one
might view them as fragments of a larger skittishness toward the work of
democracies in the realm of criminal law politics, and the purported crisis of
overcriminalization produced therefrom.50 To be sure, there is a basis for fearing
incessant overcriminalization. But the claims of pernicious democratic pathologies
in criminal law politics are also prone to exaggeration, as Professor Darryl Brown
has recently demonstrated convincingly.51  And to the extent the crisis of
4' 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
49 E.g., id. at 578-79 (overturning criminal law prohibiting consensual sodomy); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (flag desecration); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166-67 (1973)
(abortion); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (public display of offensive words); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (miscegenation).
50 I am grateful to Ron Wright for this suggestion.
51 Professor Brown summarized his findings:
Legislatures routinely decline to enact bills proposing new crimes or increased
punishments, for reasons familiar to students of legislative process.... [L]egislators also
repeal longstanding criminal statutes, reduce punishments, reduce offense severity, and
occasionally convert low-level crimes to civil infractions.... Moreover, interest groups
and popular opinion often support and sometimes drive de-criminalization reforms,
which means both that democratic sentiment is not solely in favor of ever-increasing
harshness and that democratic processes can accurately respond to that sentiment-even
when, as in the case of consensual sex crimes, popular sentiment is not uniform.
Legislatures in fact criminalize relatively little conduct that most people think should be
completely unregulated, and they sometimes reduce punishments even for widely
supported offenses .... Further, when legislatures leave outdated crimes on the books,
other components of democratic process compensate: politically accountable prosecutors
rarely prosecute (and thus effectively nullify) many of the crimes scholars complain
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overcriminalization is real, it probably does not make much sense to seek its
amelioration through choosing between the internal or external approach-simply
because there are far more direct measures available.
In any event, whether one supports the external approach or not, one can't
help but be impressed by the tremendous service performed by Logan's research
and arguments. My hope is that this essay has both shed some further light on the
topic of conversation invaluably provoked by Professor Logan and shown that the
case against the external approach is not quite as forceful as it might seem at first
blush.
Professor Logan replies to Professor Markel in the Commentary that follows.
The Editors
about.
Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2007).
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